

SECRET

Approved For Release 2001/07/27 : CIA-RDP92B01090R002600260007-5
CS-7442-60
28 June 1960

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MEMORANDUM FOR: ARC Committee Members

SUBJECT: Proposed Release of TALENT Materials

I. PROBLEM:

The Ad Hoc Requirements Committee on 13 June and 20 June 1960 entertained a proposal that TALENT materials classified "TOP SECRET CHESS" and handled within the TALENT Control System be downgraded to "SECRET", controlled, NOFORN except [REDACTED]

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II. SCOPE:

A. The TALENT materials under consideration for downgrading consist of those materials collected of the USSR.

B. Of primary concern was the wish of the U. S. Air Force, Navy and Joint Chiefs of Staff representatives that TALENT photography be included in the SAC and Navy pilots Target folders. *per to 1 May 1960*

C. The Army's representative request was based primarily on the need of Army personnel who, under the terms of the high TALENT personnel evaluation standards, are not clearable. Also secondary utilization of the photography by AMS (non-cleared) personnel for mapping.

D. The OSI/CIA representative's request is based on the fact that OSI desires to release the TALENT materials to Consultants and to outside Contractors for consultation and consideration of scientific problems and analyses. Also OSI would like to utilize the materials to brief various Committees that OSI is called upon to support. No request ably justified for clearance of these types has ever been declined either for OSI or for the Office of the Secretary of Defense, (Research and Engineering) whose TALENT Control System is handled through the Joint Chiefs of Staff TALENT Center.

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PERMISSION TO TALENT
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III. DETAILS:

A. It was tentatively agreed by the ARC that: Materials consisting of dual code word reports would be maintained under the security controls required by the highest classification of the collateral material.

B. TALENT materials of other than the USSR would remain in the TALENT System.

IV. DETAILS: (Continued)

In an effort to meet the requirements of the various Departments, Agencies and Military services and to obtain maximum utilization of information from the end products and at the same time continue to safeguard this vital information by security controls to prevent it from falling into the hands of unauthorized persons or into the hands of (friendly or unfriendly) the countries concerned the following security measures must be considered:

A. To what extent will the scope (extent of coverage) be ascertained by downgrading the materials from "TOP SECRET CHESS" in the TALENT Control System to "SECRET"?

B. Will adequate protection to this information be afforded if this material is released to Consultants or Contractors?

C. How may one remove a part of the materials from the TALENT Control System without compromising the entire system, i.e.; (USSR vs. Middle East)?

D. Will the removal of material from the System encourage false confirmation of the materials already sanitized?

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E. Will this prevent sanitization of any new materials?

F. Cannot the Military services (SAC and Navy) requirements be satisfied with photographs downgraded to "~~TOP~~ SECRET" and placed in the Target Strike folders on a "Must Know" basis?

G. If left up to the Senior Intelligence Officer of the respective services as to what material is to be removed from the System to cover the requirements of his command then what record will be furnished of the material downgraded and how does this effect the controls of other similarly classified materials.?

H. If the System is prostituted then what happens to the other operational inputs already agreed to be handled in the System?

I. Should select photography with titling removed of the USSR be released from the System classified "SECRET-NOFORN, is there any necessity for releasing original negatives, dupe positives, plots, mission coverage summaries, operational support, pilot interrogation reports or tracker film and existing TALENT intelligence reports.?

V. RECOMMENDATION:

Should the USIB and/or the ARC recommend the downgrading of TALENT materials, it is recommended from a security standpoint that in order to meet the emergency Target requirements that:

A. Target photography of the USSR with titling removed be downgraded to "~~TOP~~ SECRET" removed from the System and placed in the SAC and Navy target folders; also those Army Combat Commands concerned with USSR Targets. Such material ^{all} should not be permitted taken in the air except under actual combat conditions. A record being maintained at TALENT Headquarters of all material so sensitized.
STERILIZED.

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B. No original negatives, dupe positives, tracker film, plots, mission coverage summaries, operational support material or TALENT (PI) Intelligence reports be downgraded or removed from the System.

C. Sanitization procedures to continue as in the past for the release of materials from the System.

D. Any materials, photography or reports in the System to be made available to non-government employees as Consultants or Contractor types will require justification for TALENT billets with personnel security evaluations being based on full field investigations.

E. Storage of TALENT materials to continue in approved secure storage areas as TALENT Sub-Centers under the control of a recognized TALENT Center.

F. No TALENT information or reports be released to personnel who are not clearable under the TALENT standards.

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TALENT Security Officer, CIA

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